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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In this Note, the author examines the question of when § 301 of the Copy-
right Act preempts contract claims involving idea submissions. The author
examines two opposing views on the issue presented by the case law: namely,
(1) that courts should virtually never preempt contract claims because con-
tract rights and copyright rights are fundamentally different, and (2) that
courts should make afact-specific inquiry regarding the particular contract
and preempt a claim if the defendant breaches the contract by merely perform-
ing an act reserved to a copyright owner in § 106 of the Copyright Act.
According to the author, these opposing views are the result of the courts'
disagreement over the meaning of 17 U.S. C. § 301, which states that rights
"equivalent" to those within the general scope of copyright "are governed ex-
clusively by this title." The author argues that neither approach convinc-
ingly refutes the other and proposes an alternative, policy-based framework
for analyzing contract preemption under 17 U.S. C. § 301. The author sug-
gests that, when confronted with a contract claim involving a defendant who
has breached the contract in question by performing an act reserved to the
copyright owner under § 106, courts should preempt contract claims when
the creator-author has expressed her idea in a commercially distributed tangi-
ble medium of expression, and they should not preempt contract claims when
the creator-author has yet to disclose or sell the idea to the public in such a
form.
INTRODUCTION
Neither man [nor woman] nor nation can exist without a sublime idea.
-Fyodor Dostoyevsky
United States copyright law does not protect ideas, but rather the
expression of ideas;' in other words, "ideas ... become, after volun-
tary communication to others, free as the air to common use. ' '2 This
idea/expression dichotomy3 presents a special problem for a person
who "creates only an idea, not literary property, or who having created
literary property finds that only his idea and not its 'expression' has
been borrowed."'4 The classic "idea-person"5 is someone with an idea
for a film who submits this idea to a movie producer in hope of remu-
1 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work."); MELVILtE B. NiMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NumMER
ON COFRGHT § 16.01 (2000), LEXIS, Secondary Legal: Matthew-Bender Treatises &
Materials: Intellectual Property.
2 Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
3 For a more detailed discussion of the policy behind the idea/expression dichot-
omy, see Dennis S. Kajala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAY.
TON L. REv. 511, 520-21 (1997).
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 16.01.
5 Commentators have used the term "idea-man" in scholarship on the protection of
ideas. See, e.g., NiMmER & NiMMER, supra note 1, § 16.01; David M. McGovern, What Is Your
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neration,6 but the case law also involves idea proposals for board
games,7 advertising schemes,8 and even natural-language search capa-
bilities for legal research databases. 9 The important legal issues arise
when an idea-person believes that an idea-recipient has stolen an idea
from a proposal and used it to make money.
Because of the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright law pro-
vides little help to the idea-person who seeks to protect her ideas from
theft or copying.' 0 Accordingly, creator-authors have looked to state
contract law to protect their ideas.' Under the express contract the-
ory of idea protection, an idea-person has an enforceable contract and
may sue for damages if the idea-recipient expressly promises to pay for
an idea if it is used.'2 The implied-in-fact contract theory of idea pro-
tection is essentially no different from the express theory; properly
understood, an implied-in-fact contract "differs from an express con-
tract only in that the consent of the parties is expressed by conduct
rather than words."13 Accordingly, "a contract will be implied in fact
when the parties clearly intended payment to the extent of the use of
the plaintiffs idea, though they did not set forth that intention in
Pitch?: Idea Protection Is Nothing but Cureballs, 15 Loy. LA. .,r. LJ. 475, 475 (1995). This
Note uses the gender-neutral term and mill remove the quotation marks hereinafter.
6 See McGovern, supra note 5, at 475-77; see also, eg., Selbyv. New Line Cinema Corp.,
96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (involving a screenplay and idea submission for a
movie entitled "Doubletime").
7 See, &g., Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204,1218 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (denying relief to plaintiff alleging theft of board game idea on grounds that claim
was time barred), affid sub nom. Vantage Point, Inc. v. Milton Bradley Co., 697 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1982).
8 See, e.g., Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. HBO, No. 97 CMV. 7763 (TPG), 1999
WL 179603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (declining to preempt a contract claim for
protection of advertising campaign ideas); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Philips-Miller & Assocs.,
836 F. Supp. 520, 526 (N.D. Dl. 1993) (holding a misappropriation claim preempted when
the claim was based on the alleged theft by drug manufacturer of ideas for a marketing
scheme).
9 See, eg., Canter v. West Publ'g Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (with-
drawn from the bound volume at the request of the court) (granting summary judgment
against plaintiff alleging that West Publishing misappropriated its idea for "Query'Mate").
10 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; infra notes 215-19 and accompanying
texL
11 Cf Glen I Kulik, The Idea Submission Case: 117mn Is an Idea Proteted Under California
Law?, 32 Bmu--LY Hiurs B. Ass'NJ. 99, 104 (1998) (surveying the various possible theories
of idea protection and concluding that "[r]emaining as viable theories are breach of ex-
press contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence, and breach of
confidential relationship, all of which are based on the relationship of the parties rather
than ownership of property rights"); Lionel S. Sobel, The Law ofIdas, Revisited, I UCLA
ENT. L REv. 9, 21 (1994) ("It is now clear, however, that in virtually all cases, idea protec-
tion will be available as a matter of express or implied contract law, though in rare cases a
plaintiff may have to resort to a confidential relationship theory.").
12 NimmR & NntmEa, supra note 1, § 16.04.
13 Id. § 16.05 (citing Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953)).
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express language."14 Courts find an intent to contract from the rela-
tionship of the parties, the circumstances of the submission, and the
parties' conduct.15 Courts also find implied-in-fact contracts based on
industry custom: that is, the plaintiff may establish the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract if he can show that people in the idea-recipi-
ent's line of work generally pay for ideas received if they use them.16
Courts have placed many obstacles in the path of the idea-person
seeking protection under a contract theory. For example, some
courts continue to require ideas to be "novel" and "concrete" before
garnering protection, even when the parties contract for disclosure
regardless of novelty. 17 Two further obstacles to contract-based pro-
tection of ideas are the statute of frauds and preemption.' 8 While the
statute of frauds is beyond the scope of this Note, 19 preemption is its
central focus.
Prior to 1976, federal copyright preemption posed no serious
threat to contracts to protect ideas because these contracts generally
pertained to unpublished expressive materials, and federal copyright
law left regulation of unpublished materials to state law. 20 After 1976,
§ 301 of the Copyright Act raised the specter of preemption for any
state law claims that vindicate "legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
14 Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. HBO, No. 97 CIV. 7763 (TPG), 1999 'WL
179603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999).
15 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 16.05 [A]-[D].
16 Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627 (FK), 1997 WL 167113, at '*5
6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) (stating that [industry custom can create an implied-in-fact
contract between the parties, resulting in the requisite legal relationship needed to sup-
port a misappropriation claim"); McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("An implied-in-fact contract may be based upon industry custom or usage regarding sub-
mission and use of ideas."). But see Sobel, supra note 11, at 44-46 (questioning whether
"there actually exists any industry custom to pay for ideas" (emphasis omitted)).
17 See, e.g., Murray v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 671 F. Supp. 236, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
that lack of novelty is fatal to plaintiff's claims of misappropriation and conversion of an
idea, breach of implied agreement, breach of confidential relationship, and unjust enrich-
ment, arising out of alleged theft of the idea for "The Cosby Show"), afj'd, 844 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1988); see also McGovern, supra note 5, at 496 (noting that some courts continue to
require novelty and concreteness as prerequisites to idea protection); Steve Reitenour,
Note, The Legal Protection of Ideas: IsIt Really a GoodIdea., 18 Wm. MrrCHELL L. Rnv. 131, 146
(1992) (same).
18 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 1, § 16.04.
19 See generally id. § 16.04[B] (arguing that statute of frauds problems with respect to
contracts to protect ideas should not generally be claim-killing burdens).
20 The House Report accompanying the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act explains:
Section 301, one of the bedrock provisions of the bill, would accom-
plish a fundamental and significant change in the present law. Instead of a
dual system of "common law copyright" for unpublished works and statu-
tory copyright for published works, which has been the system in effect in
the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a
single system of Federal statutory copyright from creation.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745.
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copyright... in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright."21
This Note tackles the question of when copyright law should pre-
empt contract claims involving idea submissions. The case law
presents two opposing views on this issue.22 The first view, repre-
sented by Seventh CircuitJudge Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg,23 contends that courts should virtually never preempt
contract claims because contract rights and copyright rights are fun-
damentally different.24 The second view, represented in Endemol En-
tertainment B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc.,25 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell
Corp.,2 6 and Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp.,2 7 suggests that courts
should make a fact-specific inquiry regarding the particular contract
in question.28 Under the latter view, if a contract merely forbids an
action reserved exclusively to a copyright owner under the Copyright
Act,2 9 then courts should preempt a claim brought to enforce that
contract. After surveying these conflicting approaches, this Note con-
cludes that the "extra element" test, which courts currently apply, is an
insufficient vehicle for determining whether copyright law should pre-
empt contract claims involving promises not to use an idea without
payment. This Note proposes an alternative policy-based framework
for analyzing contract preemption under 17 U.S.C. § 301.
Part I of this Note provides background on copyright preemp-
tion, examining the subject matter requirement and the general
scope requirement in particular. Part H examines the courts' conflict-
ing approaches to copyright preemption of contract claims, specifi-
cally addressing the general scope prong of the extra element test.
21 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
22 Eg., Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly Eng'rs, LLP, 60 F. Supp. 2d 247, 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). Judge McMahon noted:
There is a split among my brothers and sisters in the District Court as to
whether a breach of contract claim can never be preempted, because the
promise inherent in every contract automatically provides the "extra ele-
ment"; or whether a promise alone is insufficient to save a breach of con-
tract claim that asserts only that defendants did something that is reserved
to the holder of a copyright.
Id. (citations omitted).
23 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
24 IR. at 1454.
25 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
26 51 F. Supp. 2d. 840 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
27 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
28 See also, ag., Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627 (JFK), 1997 WL
167113 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) (holding preempted an implied-in-fact contract claim in-
volving an idea for an educational concept for children); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 907 F. Supp. 144 (D. Md. 1995) (holding preempted a contract claim involving a
screenplay for a movie).
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Part III examines § 301 and its legislative history and explains why the
current preemption test results in a logical impasse. Finally, Part IV
focuses on copyright policy and suggests a framework for courts to
follow in augmenting the § 301 preemption test.
As a result of this policy-based analysis, this Note suggests that
courts should draw a distinction between contract claims based on
whether the creator-author expresses his idea in (1) a commercially
distributed tangible medium of expression, or (2) a tangible medium
of expression that has yet to be disclosed or sold to the public in any
form. This Note concludes that courts should preempt contract
claims involving the former if the breaching action is an act normally
reserved to a copyright owner. Courts should not preempt contract
claims involving the latter even if the breaching action is an act nor-
mally reserved to a copyright owner.
I
COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION iN GENERAL
When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976,30 it created a
single federal copyright system for both published and unpublished
works and took from the states the power to protect intellectual prop-
erty through common law copyright.3' As part of this objective, Con-
gress enacted § 301,32 which provides for copyright preemption of
state law.3 3 This statutory provision tends to simplify preemption
analysis:
Courts grappling with the tension between federal and state law may
apply various tests to determine whether the Supremacy Clause re-
quires pre-emption of state law. In the context of copyright, how-
ever, Congress has acted in explicit terms to pre-empt various state
laws through Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Because of
the existence of Section 301, in order to determine whether state
law may grant protection to works of authorship, the courts usually
need not gauge whether the federal interest in this field is domi-
nant, whether the field of federal regulation is sufficiently compre-
hensive to raise an inference of intent to pre-empt, or whether any
of the other pre-emption tests apply; rather, in general the courts
may simply turn to the explicit statutory language.34
30 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745;
NIMMER & NI MMER, supra note 1, § 1.01[A].
32 § 301, 90 Stat. at 2572 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
33 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
34 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1.01 [B] (footnotes omitted).
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Notwithstanding this simplification, if a state law claim successfully
survives § 301 analysis, courts should perform constitutional preemp-
tion analysis.35
Section 301 provides for preemption of state law claims that seek
to vindicate rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of au-
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103."36 Courts have derived a two-prong test from this statutory lan-
guage: § 301 preempts a state law claim if
(i) the state law claim seeks to vindicate "legal or equitable rights
that are equivalent" to one of the bundle of exclusive rights already
protected by copyright law under 17 U.S.C. § 106-styled the "gen-
eral scope requirement"; and (ii) the particular work to which the
state law claim is being applied falls within the type of works pro-
tected by the Copyright Act under Sections 102 and 103-styled the
"subject matter requirement."3 7
A. The Subject Matter Requirement
The first prong of § 301 preemption analysis-the subject matter
requirement-is satisfied if the subject of the plaintiff's state-law claim
35 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Betcen Cop-iight and Contract: Copy-
ight Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DunE UJ. 479, 535 (1995) ('Therefore, regard-
less of the applicability of § 301, a court might set aside as constitutionally preempted a
licensing scheme that frustrates the Act's overall objectives by contractually prohibiting the
licensee from engaging in uses that would otherwise be sanctioned by the fair use provi-
sions of the Act."); see also Mark A. Lemley, Boyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intelke-
tual Property Licensing; 87 CAl. L REv. 111, 141-42 (1999) (noting the possibility that
copyright preemption may occur, in addition to instances under § 301, when state law
enforces a contract that conflicts with federal copyright law or policy).
This two-tiered analysis-first statutory, then constitutional-flos naturally from the
notion that compliance with a statute, even one that Congress promulgates, cannot cure
underlying conflict with the Constitution. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) ("It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it. .. ."). Conflict preemption is beyond the scope of this Note.
For an interesting discussion of conflict preemption, see David Nimmer et al., The MAeamor-
phosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAu. L REv. 17, 58 (1999), which argues that a shrinkirap
license that purports to protect contractually uncopyrightable factual material should be
preempted on conflict preemption grounds.
36 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
37 Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 301); see also Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
1524, 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d
973, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1987)) (describing same test); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F.
Supp. 2d 816,821 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (same); Kienzlev. Capital Cities/Am. Broad. Co., 774F.
Supp. 432, 436 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on otherground, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), afd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)) (same); Howard v. Sterchi, 725 F. Supp. 1572, 1578-79
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (same), af'd 12 F.3d 218 (l1th Cir. 1993).
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"'fall[s] within the ambit of copyright protection"' 38 as defined by
§ 102 and § 103 of the Copyright Act. Section 102 provides that copy-
right protection adheres "in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.., from which can they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."39 Additionally, § 102 specifies
that copyright protection does not extend to any "idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery."40
The subject matter requirement implicates two fundamental
questions in idea cases. First, courts ask whether the idea that the
plaintiff seeks to protect is "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion."41 Under § 101 of the Copyright Act, "'[a] work is 'fixed' in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy...,
by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent and
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated for a period of more than transitory duration."' 42 An impor-
tant consequence of this requirement is that a plaintiff who discloses
an idea that is not embodied in writing or any other tangible medium
will avoid copyright preemption of her state law contract claim.43
Consequently, the general scope requirement issues discussed in the
remainder of this Note have no application when a contract claim in-
volves disclosure of an idea not fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. However, many creator-authors embed their ideas in tangible
media, such as in film treatments or advertising storyboards.44
The second question is whether ideas contained within a tangible
medium of expression are within the "subject matter of copyright as
38 Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 848 (alteration in original) (quoting Harper &
Row, 723 F.2d at 200).
39 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Section 103 specifically provides that compilations and deriva-
tive works fall within the subject matter of copyright. Id. § 103(a).
40 Id. § 102(b).
41 Id. § 301(a); see, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Philips-Miller & Assocs., 836 F. Supp, 520,
524 (N.D. I1. 1993).
42 G.D. Searl, 836 F. Supp. at 524 (alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
43 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocarNms:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECruAL PROPERTY § 15.2.2 (4th ed. 1997) (ex.
plaining that "[t]he House Report gives several examples of unfixed works that may be
protected by state law" and citing as examples "'choreography that has never been filmed
or notated, an extemporaneous speech, "original works of authorship" communicated
solely through conversations or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical composi.
tion ... developed from memory and without being recorded or written down'" (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747)).
44 See, e.g., Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. HBO, No. 97 CIV. 7763 (TPG), 1999
WL 179603, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (involving sample print ads, storyboards, and
advertising copy); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (S.D.N.Y.) (involving film
treatments and full length script), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
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specified by sections 102 and 103."45 One may argue that because
copyright law protects only "works of authorship" 46 (i.e., the particular
expression of ideas) and not ideas themselves, 47 only works of author-
ship constitute the subject matter of copyright law for purposes of
§ 301. 48 Following this logic, which equates subject matter for pur-
poses of protection with subject matter for purposes of preemption,
Professor Goldstein writes, "[a]s a consequence, section 301 allows
states to protect ideas, procedures, processes and methods, whether
or not they appear in the context of otherwise copyrightable works."49
If courts followed Goldstein's approach, the general scope issues
treated below would be superfluous because no contract claim relat-
ing to ideas would satisfy the subject matter prong.
In fact, however, courts have reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that ideas fixed in a tangible medium of expression are within
the subject matter of copyright law for the purposes of preemption.50
As one court aptly stated, "the shadow actually cast by the Act's pre-
emption is notably broader than the wing of its protection."5M Thus,
courts respect the integrity of Congress's decision to protect certain
45 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a).
46 Id. § 102(a).
47 K § 102(b).
48 GoLnsraN, supra note 43, § 15.2.3.
49 Id.
50 See, ag., Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Copyrightable material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section
301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims with respect to uncopyrightable as
well as copyrightable elements."); Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1058-59 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding ideas for a movie to be within the subject matter of
copyright for preemption purposes); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d. 840,
849 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (agreeing with previous determination that plaintifs claim for
breach of contract with respect to an idea for a television commercial fell within the sub-
ject matter of copyright for preemption purposes); Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v.
HBO, No. 97 CIV. 7763 (TPG), 1999 WL 179603, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (finding
that copyrightable storyboards, sample print ads, and musical recordings, as well as the
marketing idea that underlies these tangible forms, fall within the subject matter of copy-
right for preemption purposes); Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Tvwentieth Television Inc., 48
U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Even though the ideas embodied in a work cov-
ered by the Copyright Act fall outside copyright protection, this does not mean that they
fall outside the Act's scope regarding its subject matter.. . ."); Markogianis v. Burger King
Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627 (JFK), 1997 WL 167113, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) ("[Elven if
Plaintiffs did plead that portions of the SMARTEN-UP concept consist of uncopyrightable
material which the Defendant misappropriated, those portions do not take the work as a
whole outside the subject matter protected by the Copyright AcL").
51 United States ex eL Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463
(4th Cir. 1997). The House Report accompanying § 301 makes a similar point:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter catego-
ries of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it
even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too mini-
mal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the
public domain.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), nprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747.
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forms of intellectual property while refusing to protect others.5 2
States are not "'free to expand the perimeters of copyright protection
to their own liking,"' thus nullifying the practical bite of federal pre-
emption.53 In sum, courts generally agree that when a plaintiff sub-
mits an idea fixed in a tangible medium of expression, his contract
claim at least falls within the subject matter of copyright law for pre-
emption purposes.
B. The General Scope Requirement
The second prong of § 301 preemption analysis-the general
scope requirement-is satisfied "when the state law rights asserted by
the plaintiff are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
scope of copyright law"54 as provided by § 106. Section 106 grants to
the copyright owner the exclusive rights of reproduction, preparation
of derivative works, distribution, performance, and display (including
the right to authorize others to perform these actions),- z In other
words, § 301 preempts only those state law rights that "may be
abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the
exclusive rights" found in § 106.56
Under the general scope requirement, courts often apply what is
known as the "extra element" test.5 7 In applying this test, "if an 'extra
element' is 'required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduc-
tion, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a
state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie "within the
general scope of copyright," and there is no preemption.' 5 ,8 Stated
52 See Katz Dochrermann, 1999 WL 179603, at *3 ("Such a test would undermine one of
the Copyright Act's central purposes, to 'avoid the development of any vague borderline
areas between State and Federal protection.'" (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
and H.R RP,. No. 94-1476, at 131, repinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5746)).
53 Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5746).
54 Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 930 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
55 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
56 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840,850 (W.D. Mich. 1999) ("When a right
defined by state law may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of
the exclusive rights, the state law in question must be deemed preempted." (quoting
Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200)).
57 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 716 (quoting NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 1,
§ 1.01[B]); see Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (C.D. Cal. 1997);
Hogan v. DC Comics, No. 96-CV-1749, 1997 WL 570871, at *5 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 9, 1997);
Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627 JFK), 1997 WL 167113, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997); see also GoLDsrIN, supra note 43, § 15.2.1.2, at 805 ("Courts gener.
ally hold that a state right is not equivalent to copyright, and thus is not subject to preemp-
tion, if the state cause of action contains an operative element that is absent from the cause
of action for copyright infringement.").
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differently, courts require a state law cause of action to be "qualita-
tively different" from a copyright infringement action in order to sur-
vive preemption.59 In contrast to the subject matter requirement,G0
the general scope requirement, as applied through the extra element
test, creates considerable difficulty for courts performing § 301 analy-
sis on contract caims. 61
II
DuERaENT APPROACHES TO THE GENE A
SCOPE REQUIREMENT
Courts, both within and without the specific realm of idea law,
disagree over the application of § 301's general scope requirement to
contract claims. 62 They generally agree that most contract claims
should survive preemption because, under most sets of facts, the al-
leged contract-breaching action is something other than an unautho-
rized exercise of one of the copyright owner's exclusive copyright
rights, 6s and thus the contract claim is dearly not "equivalent" to an
infringement action.64 However, some courts hold that § 301 virtually
neverpreempts contract claims because of the contractual relationship
itself, while other courts contend that a contract does not provide an
extra element if the contract merely prohibits the performance of an
act reserved exclusively to the copyright holder.65 This disagreement
59 Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 907 F. Supp. 144, 145 (D. Md. 1995) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 230
(4th Cir. 1993)); see also, eg., Wrench, 51 F. Supp. 2d. at 850 ("Conversely, when a state law
violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or
the like, the rights involved are not equimalent and preemption 4il not occur." (quoting
Harper & Rm, 723 F.2d at 200)).
60 See supra Part I.A.
61 O'Rourke, supra note 35, at 519 ("[C]ourts have had some difficulty in interpreting
[the general scope] requirement.")
62 Id. at 518-19.
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (listing the rights of a copyright
owner).
64 Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 46 ("That doctrinal result is as it should be: the vast
majority of copyright contracts easily withstand muster under section 301 because the
breach alleged amounts to more than reproduction, distribution, etc., of a copyrighted
work." (emphasis added)).
65 Compare Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. HBO, No. 97 CIV. 7763 (TPG), 1999
WL 179603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (holding that an implied-in.fact contract claim
regarding ideas contained in advertising storyboards sunived preemption); Expediters
Int'l, Inc., v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Serns., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 483 (D.N.J. 1998)
(finding an extra element that distinguishes contract claims from copyright claims); Ho-
gan v. DC Comics, No. 96-CV-1749, 1997 WL 570871, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1997) (hold-
ing that an implied-in-fact contract claim regarding an idea for a comic book survived
preemption because of the "existence of a legal relationship" between the parties);
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Protec-
tion from breach of contract, however, is not equivalent to copyright protection because a
contract claim requires an 'extra element' that renders the claim qualitatively different
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is particularly important for contract claims regarding idea submis-
sions, because the ordinary idea contract will forbid the use of an idea
without compensation. "Use" in this context is analogous to repro-
duction of the idea or preparation of a derivative work based on the
idea, and § 106 reserves both of these actions exclusively to a copy-
right holder.66
A. Judge Easterbrook's Approach
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,67 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, held that § 301 virtually never preempts contract
claims because "a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright."'68 As one
commentator put it, Judge Easterbrook adopted the position that, for
preemption purposes, "contracts are different."69
The plaintiff in ProCD was the creator and distributor of CD-ROM
discs that contained a factual compilation of business and residential
listings, "includ~ing] full names, street addresses, telephone numbers,
from a claim for copyright infringement: a promise by the defendant." (citation omitted));
Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1429 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("[1]n terms of
preemption, the contract-based causes of action do allege more than the unauthorized use
of a copyrighted work. They also claim that there has been a breach of an underlying
contract between the parties based on plaintiff's ideas for Loveline."); Smith v. Weinstein,
578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.) ("A party may by contract agree to pay for ideas, even
though such ideas could not be protected by copyright law. Rights under such an agree-
ment are qualitatively different from copyright claims. .. ."), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d. Cir.
1984), with Tavormina v. Evening Star Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (S,D. Tex.
1998) ("[T]he claim is preempted insofar as Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached
their contract by not compensating Plaintiffs for displaying a copy of their house in tie
film."); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821-22 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (incor-
rectly equating an implied-in-fact contract claim regarding ideas contained in a screenplay
with a quasi-contract claim); Am. Movie Classics v. Turner Entm't Co,, 922 F. Supp. 926,
931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A) breach of contract claim is preempted if it is merely based on
allegations that the defendant did something that the copyright laws reserve exclusively to
the plaintiff (such as unauthorized reproduction, performance, distribution, or display).");
Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 907 F. Supp. 144, 145-46 (D. Md. 1995) (holding
preempted a breach of contract claim involving an idea for a movie because it established
rights that were "equivalent" to the preparation of derivative works); Wolff v. Inst. of Elec.
& Elecs. Eng'rs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In the case at bar, IEEE
breached its contract with plaintiffs, embodied in the stock photo invoice, by infringing
plaintiffs' copyright. It is difficult to see how the resulting claims are qualitatively different.
Accordingly the breach of contract claim is preempted."); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy &
Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding a breach of contract
claim preempted because "unauthorized use of copyrightable material falls squarely within
§ 301-).
66 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) (1994).
67 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.), reuk 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996). The reader
should note that ProCD is not an idea case. However, its logic applies to contracts in gen-
eral, of which idea-submission contracts are a subset.
68 Id. at 1455 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (3) (1994)).
69 Lemley, supra note 35, at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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zip codes and industry or 'SIC' codes. "70 The defendants, implicitly
relying71 on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Seruice Co.," pur-
chased a copy of the CD-ROM, downloaded the factual data, and
made "it available to third parties over the Internet for commercial
purposes."73 ProCD brought a copyright infringement claim" and a
claim for breach of the "shrinkwrap" licensing agreement that accom-
panied its software.75
A shrinkvrap license is a form contract, usually included in
software packaging; the manufacturer intends for the license to bind
the purchaser when she opens the software packaging or performs
some other required action. 76 Shrinkwrap licenses ostensibly take the
place of any bargains or agreements between mass market software
producers and consumers, because the typical software transaction
does not involve ann's length bargaining concerning use limitations.77
By using a shrinlvrap license, the producer generally seeks to pro-
hibit unauthorized copies, software rental, reverse engineering and
modifications to the software, and to limit the use of software to one
central processing unit.78 In ProCD, the plaintiffs based their breach
of contract claim on shrinkwrap license terms that prohibited the pur-
chaser from distributing, sublicensing, or leasing the software or the
data contained within the software.79 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on the contract claim on grounds
that (1) the contract was unenforceable for lack of assent on the part
of the defendants,80 and (2) even if the contract were enforceable,
§ 301 would preempt it81
70 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
71 See Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 42 ("Relying on Fdst, defendants in PrtCD cop-
ied all the listings off the plaintiff's CD-ROMs .... ").
72 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The Supreme Court held in Feist that "[flacts, whether alone
or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be cop)righted." Id. at
350. The Court explained further that "[a] factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it
features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the cop)right is limited to the
particular selection or arrangement. In no event may cop)Tight extend to the facts them-
selves." Id at 350-51.
7.3 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
74 The district court granted summaryjudgment on the cop)ight infringement claim
pursuant to Feist Id. at 650.
75 Id. at 64445.
76 Jason Kuchmay, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Setion 301 Copyrigit Premption of
Shrinkanrap Licenses-A Real Bargain for Consumers?, 29 U. ToLt L. RE%. 117, 117-18 (1997).
77 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 650. The district court also explained that commentators
saw shrinkvrap licenses as being of"questionable alidity," because (1) they pose contract-
law questions of assent, and (2) they "pose important questions about the extent to urhich
individual contract provisions can supplement or expand federal cop)right protection." AL
78 Id
79 Id. at 645.
80 1& at 655.
81 Id. at 659.
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In holding ProCD's contract claim preempted, the district court
relied on statutory preemption analysis and copyright policy analy-
sis.82 With respect to the statutory analysis, the court concluded that
the contract claim did not require an extra element because "in real-
ity, [the plaintiff's] breach of contract claim is nothing more than an
effort to prevent defendants from copying and distributing its data,
exactly what it sought to bar defendants from doing under copyright
law."8 3 In reaching its conclusion, the district court expressed its disa-
greement with three circuit court cases:84 National Car Rental System,
Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,85 Taquino v. Teledyne Mon-
arch Rubber,8 6 and Acorn Structures, Inc., v. Swantz.8 7
The district court first made a half-hearted attempt to distinguish
these cases factually88 and then stated: "To the extent that National Car
Rental, Taquino, ... and Acorn support the proposition that a copy-
right infringement claim is not equivalent to a contract claim merely
because the contract claim requires a plaintiff to show the additional
element of breach, I disagree respectfully with their conclusions."8 9
As Professor David Nimmer and his coauthors point out, this state-
ment invited reversal on appeal because "an affirmance would seem to
proclaim 'circuit conflict,' thus inviting certiorari."90 As it turns out,
the Seventh Circuit did take issue with this apparent rejection of
precedent.91
However, the district court also grounded preemption on the
fundamental conflict between enforcement of the shrinkwrap license
and overarching copyright policy.92 Accordingly, the court found that
the "[p] laintiff's license agreement is an attempt to avoid the confines
of copyright law and of Feise'93 and concluded that the contract claim
should be preempted on policy grounds because "[i]t would alter the
'delicate balance' of copyright law to allow parties to avoid copyright
law by contracting around it."94
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, reversed the
district court, concluding that (1) the shrinkwrap agreement was en-
82 See id. at 657-59.
83 Id. at 657.
84 Id. at 658.
85 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
86 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990).
87 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
88 See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 658.
89 d.
90 Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 47.
91 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
92 See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 658-59.
93 I. at 659.
94 IR. at 658.
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forceable pursuant to U.C.C. provisions for "acceptance of goods,"97
and (2) § 301 did not preempt the contract claim because the rights
protected in the shrinkwrap agreement were not "'equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. ' "96
The Seventh Circuit relied primarily on § 301 preemption analy-
sis. Judge Easterbrook denied adopting a conclusive rule that all
claims labeled "contract" would escape preemption.9 7 However, the
opinion's language and logic tell a different story, in which it is in-
deed hard to imagine a contract claim not considered qualitatively
different. Judge Easterbrook first addressed the issue of the district
court's disagreement with National Car Renta4 Acorn, and Taquino, stat-
ing: "But are rights created by contract 'equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright'? Three courts of
appeals have answered 'no.' The district court disagreed with these
decisions, but we think them sound."98
The resounding "no" that Judge Easterbrook attributes to the
three circuit court decisions appears absolute and unqualified by fac-
tual idiosyncrasies. Contributing to this impression of conclusiveness,
the court explained why it believed National Car Rental, Acorn, and Ta-
quino represented the correct view, delivering a statement that leaves
very little room for any putative "equivalency" between contract and
copyright:
Rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright" are rights established by law-rights that restrict
the options of persons who are strangers to the author. Copyright
law forbidsduplication, public performance, and so on, unless the
person wishing to copy or perform the work gets permission; silence
means a ban on copying. A copyright is a right against the world. Con-
tracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they
please, so contracts do not create "exclusive riglts."99
Indeed, subsequent courts arguing for the proposition that § 301 can
never preempt contract claims have relied on just this language.100
Having so dealt with the district court's § 301 argument, the Seventh
Circuit dismissed the district court's policy concerns as
insubstantial.10
95 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id. at 1454-55 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994)).
97 Id. at 1455 ("Like the Supreme Court in Wo!ens, we think it prudent to refrain from
adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemp-
tion clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to foresee.").
98 Id. at 1454 (citations omitted).
99 Id. (second emphasis added).
100 Kg., Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (quoting this statement); Expediters Int'l, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo MgmL Sers.,
Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 483 (D.N.J. 1998) (same).
101 See.ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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Judge Easterbrook's view is consistent 0 2 with that taken by many
courts and commentators in the realm of idea law, namely, that the
promise involved in a contractual relationship is itself an extra ele-
ment regardless of whether the defendant breaches the contract by
performing an act that § 106 of the Copyright Act reserves exclusively
to a copyright owner.10 3 For example, Professor Nimmer, a leading
commentator in the area, states that contracts relating to ideas are
generally not preempted because, under the extra element test,
"[the] additional element is a promise (express or implied) upon the
part of the defendant."104 Thus, there is a strong argument that
courts should not preempt contract claims regarding idea submissions
because the contractual relationship always precludes satisfaction of
the general scope requirement.
102 The court in Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
drew an analytic distinction between judge Easterbrook's argument regarding "the limited
scope of rights protected by contract [as opposed to] the universal scope of rights pro-
tected by copyright" and other arguments against preemption that posit that "the promise
to perform the contract constitutes an extra element." Id. at 1059. This Note treats these
views as a single class for the sake of convenience and because both locate the reason for
avoiding preemption in the contractual relationship.
103 See, e.g., Katz Dochrermann & Epstein v. HBO, No. 97 CIV. 7763 (TPG), 1999 WL
179603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (holding that an implied-in-fact contract claim re-
garding ideas contained in advertising materials survived preemption); Hogan v. DC
Comics, No. 96-CV-1749, 1997 WL 570871, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1997) (holding that a
state law misappropriation claim based on submission of idea for comic book, grounded
on either an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law contract, contained an "extra element"
and was therefore not preempted); Howard v. Sterchi, 725 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (holding that breach of contract and breach of implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing claims, arising out of misappropriation of plaintiff's designs for log homes, were
not preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act), affd, 12 F.3d 218 (11th Cir. 1993); Ronald
Litoff, Ltd. v. Am. Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981,986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Count eleven of the
amended complaint is for breach of contract. That claim is qualitatively different from a
copyright claim and therefore not preempted by Section 301."); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.
Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that a breach of contract claim regarding disclosure
of prison rodeo concept for a film was not preempted because rights under express or
implied agreements are qualitatively different from copyright claims), affd, 738 F.2d 419
(2d Cir. 1984); Kulik, supra note 11, at 104 (noting that express and implied-in-fact con-
tract claims continue to be viable theories of idea protection despite copyright preemption
because they are based on the relationship of the parties rather than ownership of prop-
erty rights); McGovern, supra note 5, at 492 n.81 (noting that courts have considered
claims based on contractual agreements to be qualitatively different from copyright
claims); O'Rourke, supra note 35, at 523 (arguing, in the context of claims regarding fully
negotiated contracts, that the "extra element is a breach of promise ... that would not
exist but for the parties' agreement"); Camilla M.Jackson, Note, "I've Got This Great Idea for
a Movie!" A Comparison of thw Laws in California and New York that Protect Idea Submissions, 21
CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & AR-rs 47, 65 (1996) ("State intellectual property law governing Idea
submissions is unlikely to be preempted by federal copyright law .... ."); Reitenour, supra
note 17, at 151 ("The express and implied contract theories include the element of a con-
tractual relationship, thus effectively removing them from the scope of preemption.").
104 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 16.04[C] (emphasis added). However, Nimmer
does not purport to set out a conclusive rule, but merely states that "[f] ederal pre-emption
would nevertheless seem to be avoided ... ." Id. (emphasis added); see also infra note 143
(discussing the apparent contradictions in the Nimmer treatise).
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B. Endenw Wrench, Selby, and the Fact-Specific Approach to
Copyright Preemption of Contract Claims
Taking an opposing view, some courts look closely at the contract
in question and ask whether the breaching action consists of the de-
fendant performing an act reserved exclusively to a copyright owner
in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (in which case preemption is appropriate) or
whether the defendant breaches the contract by performing an act
other than those reserved in § 106 (in which case preemption is not
appropriate),105 In three recent idea cases, federal district courts
have adopted this approach.
1. Endemol Entertainment B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc.
In Endemol Entertainment B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., °6 the
plaintiff, Endemol Entertainment ("Endemol"), alleged that the de-
fendants, Twentieth Television, Jonathan Goodson, and various pro-
duction companies, "improperly appropriate[d] the substance of
Plaintiff's television show, FORGIVE ME, which he [had] distributed
in Europe since 1991."107 In 1994, Endemol attended a trade conven-
tion "at which new television programs [were] licensed, sold, and mar-
keted."108 Endemol "presented 'Forgive Me' tojonathan Goodson...
who was then an officer for Mark Goodson Productions, Inc ..... , for
potential licensing in the United States."0 9 The court acknowledged
that "[alt all times it was understood that disclosure of the format,
including sample programs, was made in confidence and that Plaintiff
would be compensated for any subsequent use of any ideas that might
be used.""10 Endemol asserted that Goodson developed a show based
on the "format, expression, and concepts of 'Forgive Me'" and pro-
duced a television pilot program entitled "Forgive and Forget" along
with defendants Twentieth Television and Monet Lane Productions,
Inc."'
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for breach
of implied-in-fact contract on preemption grounds."12 Rejecting En-
demol's argument that contract rights are different from copyright
rights because contract rights "involve an agreement between the par-
105 Se4 e.g., Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tavormina v. Evening Star Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 729,734 (S.D. Tex.
1998); Wolff v. Inst. of Elec. & Elec. Eng'rs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
106 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
107 Id. at 1524.
108 Id. at 1525.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Id. at 1526.
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ties rather than a 'right against the world,"' the District Court for the
Central District of California held that § 301 preempted the plaintiffs
implied-in-fact contract claim. 1 3 The court based its holding on the
fact that the contract at issue created "no additional rights other than
promising not to benefit from the copyrighted work," and that the
plaintiff's claim asserted "no violation of rights separate from those
copyright law was designed to protect." 1 4 The court distinguished
ProCD and National Car Rental, explaining that those "cases involved
written contracts that had specific promises that provided an 'extra
element' beyond copyright law protections."' 15
2. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.
Adopting Endemols approach"16 in Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell
Cop., 1 17 the District Court for the Western District of Michigan held
that § 301 preempts implied-in-fact contracts that merely forbid the
performance of an act reserved exclusively to a copyright holder
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.118 The Wrench court thus rejected the notion
that the contractual relationship itself provides an extra element for
purposes of the general scope requirement."19
The Wrench plaintiffs developed a cartoon character known as
"Psycho Chihuahua," which they promoted and marketed through
their wholly-owned limited liability company, Wrench LLC.120 Psycho
Chihuahua was a "caricature of a feisty, edgy, confident Chihuahua
with a big dog's attitude."' 21 At first, Wrench LLC itself marketed the
Psycho Chihuahua character on T-shirts and other merchandise; by
1996, Wrench had licensed the rights to produce Psycho Chihuahua
merchandise to several large manufacturers. 22
In June 1996, the plaintiffs attended a licensing trade show in
New York City and met Ed Alfaro and Rudy Pollak, Taco Bell's Crea-
tive Services Manager and Vice President of Administration and Em-
ployee Programs respectively. 123 Negotiations ensued between the
plaintiffs and Taco Bell (via Alfaro) regarding Taco Bell's use of the
Psycho Chihuahua idea.124 Taco Bell conceded at the summaryjudg-
113 Id. at 1528.
14 Id.
115 Id.
116 Wrench LLO v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840, 853 (W.D. Mich. 1999)
("Wrench III") ("[T]he Court finds the Endemol rationale to be persuasive.").
117 51 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D. Mich. 1999) ("Wrench III").
118 Id. at 853.
119 Id. at 852-53.
120 Id. at 842.
121 Id.
122 Id
123 Id.
124 Id. at 847.
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ment stage that there was "sufficient evidence in the record to support
Plaintiff's allegation that the parties had a basic understanding that if
Taco Bell used the Psycho Chihuahua idea, concept, or image, that
Taco Bell would compensate Plaintiffs for the fair value of such
use."
125
When Taco Bell started running television commercials featuring
a "suave male Chihuahua with a taste for Taco Bell food and known
for the line, 'Yo quiero Taco Bell,'"126 the plaintiffs claimed that Taco
Bell had "misappropriated their creative images, ideas, concepts, and
designs for its own use without compensating the Plaintiffs for use of
their property."127 The plaintiffs' original complaint alleged breach
of implied-in-fact contract, unjust enrichment, misappropriation, con-
version, and dilution of trademark and unfair competition under
Michigan and California law.' 28
In its June 18, 1998 opinion granting in part and denying in part
Taco Bell's motion to dismiss Wrench's state law claims, the district
court held that federal copyright law preempted the unjust enrich-
ment claim 129 but that § 301 did not preempt Wrench's misappropria-
tion, conversion, and unfair competition claims.' 30 The court
retained these claims "because they require Plaintiffs to prove an extra
element not required for a copyright infringement claim, namely, the
existence of a legal relationship arising from an implied contract." 131
However, Taco Bell then moved for summary judgment on
grounds that "[p]laintiffs have not established an implied in fact con-
tract, or alternately, if they have, their claims are preempted by the
Copyright Act because the implied contract creates legal rights that
are equivalent to the rights within the general scope of copyright."13 2
In the court's opinion from June 10, 1999, the court departed from its
125 Id. Taco Bell conceded this hoping that the court vwould grant summary judgment
on the contract claim because "the parties did not agree on any of the essential terms that
would normally be included in a licensing agreement, such as price, duration, scope of
use, and exclusivity." I&. The court disagreed with Taco Bell on this issue, however, hold-
ing that the alleged general understanding between Alfaro and the plaintiffs could consti-
tute an implied-in-fact contract for purposes of suriving summaryjudgment. Id. at 848.
126 t. at 842.
127 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1034 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
("Wrench 1").
128 Id
129 Id. at 1037-38.
130 See id. at 1038, 1039, 1040; Wrench 11, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
'3' Wrench I, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 846; see Wrench 1, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038-40. The district
court supplemented the holding of ench I in another opinion in which it "struck Plain-
tiffs' allegations of a legal relationship arising from a quasi contract on the basis that such
allegations were inconsistent with the Court's earlier determination that Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim was preempted." Wrendt 111 51 F. Supp. 2d at 846; = Wrench LLC v.
Taco Bell Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790-91 (W.D. Mich. 1998) ("Wrench I1").
132 Wrench II, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
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earlier holding that the plaintiffs' implied-in-fact contract allegations
were sufficient to meet the extra element test because "an implied-in-
fact contract requires mutual assent and consideration."13 3 The court
granted summary judgment on the state law claims, holding that "al-
though Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to establish an im-
plied in fact contract, those claims are subject to copyright
preemption." 13 4
Specifically, the Wrench court determined that there was no per se
rule against preemption of contract claims under § 301 ls5 and held
that "[t]he rights Plaintiffs are asserting are equivalent to rights under
the Copyright Act because they are based upon Taco Bell's reproduc-
tion or use of Plaintiffs' ideas for creation of derivative works."'19
Thus, the court concluded that Wrench's contract claim had no extra
element:
Although rights may be created by a promise, whether express or
implied, they do not render a claim for breach of that promise
"qualitatively different" if they are infringed by the same conduct
prohibited by the Copyright Act. Here, Taco Bell's alleged promise
not to use Plaintiffs' ideas and concepts does not differ from the
Copyright Act's prohibition against preparing derivative works from
or displaying copyrighted works.' 37
The Wrench court also provided future courts with precedent for the
general proposition that "[a] promise not to use another's ideas and
concepts without paying for them 'is equivalent to the protection pro-
vided by section 106 of the Copyright Act.""138
Central to the Wrench court's reasoning is its criticism of Judge
Easterbrook's characterization of circuit precedent in ProCD.l5 9 Judge
Easterbrook attributed to National Car Renta Taquino, and Acorn the
nearly absolute proposition that contract claims avoid copyright pre-
emption because contract rights are not "'equivalent to any of the
133 Wrench 1!, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 791 n.2.
134 Wrench II, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 846-47. The courtjustified its departure from and
reconsideration of its earlier opinions on three grounds: (1) "Taco Bell's prior motions to
dismiss did not focus specifically on the implied in fact contract claim," (2) "the preemp-
tion argument presents a question of fact in the sense that the Court must examine the
precise nature of Plaintiffs' implied-in-fact contract," and (3) "if Taco Bell is correct, an
enormous amount of money, probably millions of dollars, will be spent pursuing and re-
sisting an invalid theory." I& at 849.
135 Id. at 853 ("Sometimes implied in fact contracts are preempted, and sometimes
implied in fact contracts are not preempted. It depends upon the precise contract right
being asserted.").
186 Id.
137 Id. (citation omitted).
138 Id. (quoting Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th
Cir. 1987)); see infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (examining the Wrench court's
misquotation of this language).
139 Wrench H1, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
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exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright'' 140 The
Wrench court adopted Professor David Nimmer's criticism of Judge
Easterbrook's opinion.141 Nirmmer argues that (1) Judge Easterbrook
mischaracterized the holdings of National Car Rental, Taquino, and
Acorn, (2) these cases turn on their own peculiar facts, and (3) the
holdings of these cases are consistent with the ProCO district court's
position that while most contract claims should not be preempted,
preemption is appropriate in certain circumstances when the contract
merely "forbid[s] reproduction, distribution, or display." 142 The
140 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
141 Wrench 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53.
142 Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 50 (stating that '[t]he fact-specific holdings of
these cases-that contracts that did not merely forbid reproduction, distribution, or dis-
play are not preempted-follow the same rule as National Car Rental' and that "parallel
logic dictates that Taquino and Acorn in no way undermine the district court's ruling").
This argument also appears in NIrtAm. & NinnsmR, supra note 1, § 1.01[B][1] (a]. Nim-
mer's (and thus the IWench court's) argument is supported by an examination of these
three cases.
In National Car Rental the court did not adopt a conclusive rule in favor of non-
preemption of contract claims. Rather, the court looked at the specific facts of the case,
which involved a contractual promise not to use a computer program to process data for
third parties, Nat'1 Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428
(8th Cir. 1993), and concluded that "the contractual restriction on use of the programs
constitutes an additional element making this cause of action not equivalent to a copyright
action." Rd at 432. The court made it clear that processing data for third parties ims the
contractually "prohibited act" and that "[n]one of the ecxdusive cop)right rights grant
[Computer Associates] that right of their own force." rd. at 433. The court, however, also
made clear that it was not adopting a hard-and-fast rule that courts should preempt con-
tract claims involving contracts that prohibit actions reserved to copyright holders under
§ 106. d2 at 434 n.6 ("Because we decide that the specific contract right [Computer Asso-
ciates] seeks to enforce is not equivalent to any of the copyTight rights, we do not need to
decide whether a breach of contract claim based on a Tongful exercise of one of the
exclusive copyright rights is preempted."). Because of the nature of the contract-breach-
ing action in this case, it is almost impossible to conclude, as Judge Easterbrook did, that
National Car Rental stands for the proposition that the contractual relationship itself pre-
cludes preemption regardless of the nature of the contractually prohibited act.
The Taquino case is also factually different from the ProCD case because Taquino in-
volved a breach of a covenant not to compete. See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber,
893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990). Like the breaching action in National Car Renta
competing does not invade a right reserved exclusively to a copyright holder, so the hold-
ing of nonpreemption does not support a conclusive proposition that all contract claims
avoid preemption even when the breaching action is one reserved exclusively to a copy-
right holder.
Acorn involved an architect's "design agreement" wherein "while Swantz did not have
to use Acorn's plans, if he did use Acorn's plans then he was obligated either to purchase
the plans from Acorn or to purchase his building materials from Acorn." Acorn Structures,
Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988). Swantz did neither, but rather gave
Acorn's designs to another architect to construct a home. Id. at 925. Here, the breaching
action does appear to be the unauthorized exercise of an exclusive copyright right: either
the right to make derivative works from the plans or to distribute the plans. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2), (3) (1994). However, Acorn does not stand for the proposition that a contract
itself provides an extra element for purposes of the general scope requirement. Rather,
the basis of the Fourth Circuit's holding was that the contract ias not vithin the subjed
matter of copyright law, thus failing to satisfy the subject matter prong. Acom, 846 F.2d at
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Wrench court concluded, quoting Nimmer for the propositions that
"the rule safeguarding contract causes of action against copyright pre-
emption is less than categorical" and that "pre-emption should con-
tinue to strike down claims that, though denominated 'contract,'
nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of expressive
materials."143
3. Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp.
In Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp.,14 the District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California followed the approach set forth in Endemol
and Wrench,145 preempting a claim to enforce an implied-in-fact con-
tract that merely prohibited the defendants from using the plaintiff's
ideas without compensation. 146 The plaintiff Selby thought of an idea
for a movie and wrote a screenplay entitled "Doubletime" based upon
that idea.147 "He registered the screenplay with the Writer's Guild of
America and... obtained a federal copyright registration.' 48 Selby's
agents then submitted the screenplay and the ideas for the screenplay
to the New Line Cinema Corp. ("New Line") for consideration.1 49
New Line rejected the submission after examining it, but requested
926 ("Acorn's cause of action is based upon this implicit provision of the contract which
does not arise out of the subject matter of copyright and is therefore a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action.").
143 Wrench lIf, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53 (quoting MELVILLE B. NiMMER & DAVID Ntstsiet,
NIMIIER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B] [1] [a], at 1-22 (1977)). Substantially the same language
appears in Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 50. A curious aspect of David Nimmer's argu,
ment here is that it appears inconsistent with the assertion in his treatise that contracts to
protect ideas generally escape preemption because the contractual relationship itself con-
stitutes an extra element. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 16.04[C]; supra note 104
and accompanying text.
One may explain this apparent contradiction by noting the fact that David Nimmer,
who coauthored "The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand," Nimmer et al., supra note
35, and who currently updates the Nimmer treatise, did not originally write the treatise's
section on "The Law of Ideas," NiMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 16. His father, Melville
Nimmer, penned that section. Sobel, supra note 11, at 11-12 (explaining that Melville Nim-
mer originally wrote a law review article entitled "The Law of Ideas" in 1954, subsequently
incorporated this article into his treatise, regularly updated the treatise for some time, and
that his son, David Nimmer, now updates the treatise). Melville Nimmer may have advo-
cated the more conventional approach that a contract always constitutes an extra element,
while David Nimmer may now, especially in light of his policy-based disagreement with the
ProCD opinion, see Nimmer et al., supra note 35, at 50-63, support the argument that a
contract does not necessarily provide an extra element.
In any case, this apparent contradiction indicates the difficulty of the current task
facing courts that attempt to apply the extra element test to contract claims.
144 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
145 Id. at 1062 (citing both Endemol and Wrench as examples of analogous cases).
146 Id. at 1061-62.
147 Id. at 1054.
148 Id. at 1055.
149 Id.
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that Selby show them any further drafts that he might write.Y5 0 The
court assumed that "[a]t the time [of] the presentation [i.e., the sub-
mission of the screenplay and ideas] ... defendants knew and under-
stood that Selby expected to be compensated and receive screen
credit if defendants used the Ideas for the creation, development and
production of a theatrical feature film."' 5 ' Subsequently, New Line
purchased another screenplay entitled "Frequency" from Toby Em-
merich, a codefendant, and New Line produced a film from this
screenplay.' 52 Selby believed that Emmerich copied the ideas and ex-
pression of "Doubletime" in creating "Frequency." 53 Along with a
copyright infringement claim, Selby brought a breach of implied-in-
fact contract claim against New Line, alleging that New Line used his
ideas in producing "Frequency" without compensating him or provid-
ing him with any screen credit.15 4
The Selby court adopted a "fact-specific approach" that required
examining whether "'the right in question is infringed by the mere
act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display.' " r5 The
court refused to view the contractual relationship itself as an extra
element:
Suppose, [for example], that the defendant promised "I will not in-
fringe any copyright or copyright protection in the script you are
proposing to show me." In that case, the very promise is so inextri-
cably entwined with the copyright that to permit the promisee to
sue upon it would undermine the preemption feature of the Copy-
right Act.156
The Selby court also rejected Judge Easterbrook's conceptual argu-
ment about the fundamental differences between copyright and con-
tract rights.' 57 The court criticized Judge Easterbrook for his failure
to appreciate the difference between a contract that merely forbids
copying (or other § 106 actions) and a contract that forbids conduct
other than copying (or other § 106 actions).158 Mirroring Endemol
and Wrench, the Selby court concluded that "[b]ecause the alleged im-
plied-in-fact contract between Selby and defendants did not regulate
150 Id.
151 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 Id. at 1061 (quoting Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991
F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993)) (second internal quotation marks omitted). St,&it thus com-
pletely deconstructs Judge Easterbrook's discussion of circuit precedent in ProCD by citing
Nationa, Car Rental for the exact opposite proposition thatJudge Easterbrook attributed to
it. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
156 Selby, 96 F. Supp.2d at 1060.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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the parties' conduct beyond mere use of Selby's ideas, the rights pro-
tected by that contract were equivalent to the exclusive rights pro-
tected by the Act [and are thus preempted]."' 59
III
TBE IMPASSE: THE AMBIGUITY OF "EQUIVALENT" RIGHTS
The above cases set forth two competing visions as to whether
courts should preempt claims involving contracts that merely prohibit
the defendant from performing acts exclusively reserved to a copy-
right owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106. The courts essentially disagree
over the meaning of § 301 when it states that rights "equivalent" to
those within the general scope of copyright "are governed exclusively
by this title."160 This Note contends that neitherJudge Easterbrook's
approach in ProCD nor the Endemol-Wrench-Selby approach convinc-
ingly vanquishes the other; both approaches present equally compel-
ling interpretations of "equivalent rights" in the context of idea-
submission contracts. Thus, contracts that merely forbid the "use" of
a plaintiff's ideas create a paradoxical situation: copyright rights and
contract rights appear simultaneously equivalent and not equivalent.
A. Statutory Language
The logical starting point for determining the meaning of
"equivalent" rights is the statutory provision itself. In relevant part,
§ 301 states that rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by [the
Act]."161 But what rights are "equivalent"? Like Judge Easterbrook,
one can argue persuasively that contract rights and copyright lights
are simply not "equivalent" as the term is commonly understood.
Copyrights are "right[s] against the world" that bind strangers and
acquaintances alike in the absence of any legal relationship. 162 In
contrast, contract rights only bind those who actively choose to enter
into an agreement. 16 Approached this way, contracts and copyright
rights are not "equivalent," and the statute does not call for
preemption.
159 Id. at 1062. Interestingly, the Selby court expressly rejected the plaintiff's suggestion
that its holding would signal the "'death knell to idea submission cases.'" Id. at 1062 n.8
(quoting the plaintiff's opposition brief). The court explained that parties could enter
into "[a]n idea submission contract [which] could create rights that are qualitatively differ-
ent from the rights protected by the Copyright Act" if they inserted a confidentiality provi-
sion. Id.
160 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
161 1&,
162 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
163 Id
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But an "equivalent" right might also refer to a plaintiff's right to
redress for certain conduct regardless of the context, either in tort or
contract. If the plaintiff has the right to forbid a certain action, the
statute is arguably indifferent to the source of that right. Further-
more, as the Selby court points out, the distinction between a contract
right and a copyright right blurs as the substance of the contractual
obligation approaches the substance of the statutory grant of rights.Y6
However, because the statute only speaks of preemption of
"equivalent" rights and does not explain exactly what "equivalent"
means,165 there is no persuasive statutory argument for choosing one
of these interpretations over the other.
B. House Report 1476 and Legislative History
Absent clarity on the face of the statute, one might examine the
House Report accompanying the 1976 revisions to the Act 1GG and the
statute's legislative history for guidance. The House Report seems to
support Judge Easterbrook's argument that contract rights are not
equivalent to copyright rights when it states that "[n] othing in the bill
derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and to
sue for breaches of contract." 167 However, this statement is not dis-
positive of whether a particular contract claim is "equivalent" to a cop-
yright claim; Congress might have included this language merely to
alleviate anxiety about enforcement of licensing agreements.
v The statutory provision's history further complicates the interpre-
tive dilemma. The first version of § 301(b) (3) expressly listed misap-
propriation, breach of contract, breach of trust, trespass, conversion,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices as
claims that should survive preemption.16 TheJustice Department ob-
jected to the inclusion of misappropriation in this list, and Congress
subsequently deleted the entire list.169 While logically this deletion
cannot mean that Congress wanted § 301 to preempt all contract
claims regarding inteliectual property,i70 the context surrounding its
164 See Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
165 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
166 H.R. ReP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
167 Id. at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5748.
168 Id. at 24 (not reprinted in U.S.C.CAN.) (shouing a copy of the bill as originally
written); see also NwWmR & NLBmR, supra note 1, § 1.01[B] [1] [f][i] & n.175 (discussing
§ 301(b) (3) as originally drafted).
169 SeeNr sFeR & Nm.wER, supra note 1, § 1.01 [B] [1] IfJ [i]; O'Rourke, supra note 35, at
517-18.
170 The court in Woffv. Institute ofEfettrical &Eale nicsEnginans, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), took the position that because Congress deleted the "safe harbor" for
breach of contract claims created in the first version of the bill, there was a presumption
that Congress intended these claims to be preempted. Id. at 69. Professor Nimmer
soundly rejects this argument. See Nn.use & NIM.R, supra note 1, § 1.01 [B] [1] [a].
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deletion might suggest that Congress intended to eschew absolute
rules against preemption. 171 Congress might have intended to grant
courts discretion to make ad hoc determinations of what state law
claims should survive preemption, rather than providing a conclusive
list. After all, if Congress only wanted to alleviate the Justice Depart-
ment's concern with misappropriation claims, then it could have de-
leted only this cause of action, leaving the other examples, including
breach of contract, intact.
On the other hand, one could convincingly argue the opposite
position. As Professor O'Rourke points out, "both the original inclu-
sion of breach of contract as an example of a cause of action that
would survive preemption and the reason for deletion of the list of
examples suggest that Congress did not intend, as a general rule, to
preempt breach of contract actions under the Act."'1 72 Frustratingly,
even Professor O'Rourke limits her assertion by inserting the phrase
"as a general rule,"173 leaving the possibility that Congress may have
intended to preempt some contract claims. Accordingly, the legislative
history and House Report provide no substantial guidance in deter-
mining whether courts should preempt implied-in-fact contract claims
regarding idea submissions.
C. Conceptual and Practical Arguments
Leaving behind statutory analysis, one might attempt to resolve
the issue by ruminating on the conceptual nature of contract rights
and copyright rights. On this level, Judge Easterbrook's argument in
ProCD that "[a] copyright is a right against the world" and that
" [c] ontracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers
may do as they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights" 1 74
is very persuasive. Occam's razor' 75 suggests adoption of this ap-
171 Cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1.01[B] [1] [f] [i] n.177 ("Although the Jug-
tice Department letter objected mainly to the reference to 'misappropriation,' it also sug-
gested deletion of the other listed causes of action in § 301 (b) (3) on the ground that they
too 'may be construed' to negate pre-emption.").
172 O'Rourke, supra note 35, at 518.
173 I&
174 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
175 Occam's razor, or Ockham's razor, is a philosophic methodology which counsels
that, when confronted with two equally probable solutions, the simpler and more direct
solution is always preferable. Cf WEBSRTR'S THia INTERNATIONAL DICToIOARY 1561 (1986)
(defining the term "Ockham's razor" as "the philosophic rule that entities should not be
multiplied unnecessarily"). Occam's razor is also a general call for simplification of a mat-
ter. Courts have adopted this methodology in both its senses. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Team-
sters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 575 (1990) (Brennan,J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]here remains little purpose to our rattling
through dusty attics of ancient writs. The time has come to borrow William of Occam's
razor and sever this portion of our analysis."); United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d
701, 708 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Occam's Razor also supports the magistrate judge's decision.
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proach; the contrary approach-looking past the contract itself to the
breaching action to determine equivalency-is both more compli-
cated and less intuitive because it requires courts to suppress the obvi-
ous existence of a contractual relationship.
But on a practical level, good reasons exist to ignore the contrac-
tual obligation when identifying an extra element. First, courts may
often suspect that a plaintiff is merely fabricating a "contract" in order
to circumvent the limitations of copyright law, especially in the con-
text of idea submissions, when an infringement claim will probably be
unavailable or unhelpful.' 76 This suspicion may be especially keen in
the case of implied-in-fact, rather than express, contracts. Second, be-
cause of the substance of the contractual obligation in question-to
pay for an idea if used-courts may be inclined to view these contracts
as creating only tort-like obligations. The statement "I promise not to
use your idea without paying you," which might be the proper subject
of a contract action, is substantially similar to the statement, "I will not
steal your idea," which might be the proper subject of a tort (i.e., in-
fiingement) or unjust enrichment claim. Finally, the actual bargain-
ing process or nature of assent in some contractual situations may be
quite minimal, thus deflating conceptual arguments positing a funda-
mental difference between copyright rights and contract rights based
on the active participation (or lack thereof) of the legally bound
parties.1' 7 7
The conspiratorial theory offered by Navarro simply does not make much sense."); Diaz v.
Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997) ("That is how the district
judge proceeded in Diaz's case, which implies that it is best to take Occam's Razor and
slice off unnecessary steps and proceed directly to the question whether the midence
would permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that the statute has been violated.").
176 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an origi-
nal work of authorship extend to any idea... regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems faced by an idea-person because of the idea/
expression dichotomy); cf also, ag., Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CMV. 4627
(JFK), 1997 WL 167113, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 8, 1997) (expressing concern that
"[pilaintffs attempt to differentiate their claim by couching it as one for a breach of an
implied-in-fact contract to pay for the value of the [p]laintf's ideas" and concluding that
"[pilaintiffs have not adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract").
177 This point becomes clear in the shrinkwrap license context. Consummation of a
binding shrinhkvrap license requires a lower level of assent than a traditional arm's length
bargaining process. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copright Polity and the Limits of Frcdom of Con-
tract, 12 BERKELEY TEcH. UJ. 93, 110 (1997). Furthermore, because software proprietors
that make use of shrinkirap licenses generally enjoy copyright protection for their cxpres-
sive material, they can basically deny all access to expressive material if a consumer refuses
to agree to the shrinkvrap license. Id. With shrinkwrap licenses requiring a lower stan-
dard of assent and their proprietors being able to deny access to all those vho will not
contract with them, the contract right begins to look a lot like a "right against the world,"
especially when every copy of a piece of expressive material is accompanied by a shrink-
wrap license.
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Because the former arguments function on a conceptual level
and the latter arguments function on a practical level, neither wholly
refutes the other nor satisfactorily explains what Congress intended
when it stated that § 301 preempts "equivalent" rights.1 78
D. Shortcomings of Both Approaches
Finally, both approaches suffer (relatively) equally from short-
comings that make them less convincing. As noted above, Judge Eas-
terbrook's mischaracterization of circuit court precedent undermines
his approach. 79 Close examination of the Endemol-Wrench-Selby line
reveals trouble spots as well.
Both Endemol and Wrench (and Selby because it relies on these two
cases) make suspect use of precedent and scholarly authority. Both
cases hinge on the assertion, stated in Wrench in language borrowed
from the Ninth Circuit, that "[a] promise not to use another's ideas
and concepts without paying for them 'is equivalent to the protection
provided by section 106 of the Copyright Act."'" 80 In Del Madera
Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc.,181 Judge Thompson of the Ninth
Circuit wrote, "an implied promise not to use or copy materials within
the subject matter of copyright is equivalent to the protection pro-
vided by section 106 of the Copyright Act."18 2 But Judge Thompson
made this statement in the context of dismissing an unjust enrichment
claim, not, as would be appropriate in the Wrench context, an implied-
infact contract claim.183 The "implied promise" that is "equivalent to
the protection provided by section 106" in the Ninth Circuit's lan-
guage is a promise implied by law to avoid unjust enrichment, not a
bona fide promise requiring mutual assent. 84
178 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
179 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the critique by the Wrench
court and David Nimmer of Judge Easterbrook's characterization of National Car Rnta
Taquino, and Acorn).
180 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840, 853 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (quot-
ing Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987)); see
also Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1528 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) ("Plaintiff's breach of implied contract claim falls squarely into the category of
contract claims that allege no additional rights other than promising not to benefit from
the copyrighted work.").
181 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987).
182 Id. at 977.
183 See id.
184 Implied-in-fact contracts and implied-in-law contracts (sometimes called quasi-con-
tracts) are conceptually and practically distinct. Implied-in-fact contracts are similar to ex-
press contracts because both require the contracting parties' mutual assent to an
agreement. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRATS § 1.19, at 55-57 (West rev.
ed. 1993); see also ROBERT S. SuMERs & ROBERT A. HiLMmN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBI-
GATION: THEORY, DocrRINE, AND PRAcnrclE 142 (3d ed. 1997) ("A contract implied in fact is
one kind of enforceable agreement with consideration-one in which the facts of agree-
ment and consideration are based on implication and inference rather than on explicit
630 [Vol. 86:603
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On the same point, the Endemol court misquotes scholarly author-
ity. First, the Endemol court writes, "even those who assert that con-
tract claims generally are not preempted have made explicit
exceptions in the case of implied contracts."en The court supports
this statement by citing Nimmer's treatise; the court's parenthetical
reads, "noting 'contract causes of actions are not typically pre-
empted,' but that implied contracts as a species of quasi contract 'should
be regarded as an "equivalent right" and pre-empted insofar as it ap-
plies to copyright subject matter.'" 18 6 Here, the Endemol court incor-
rectly quotes out of Nimmer's section on unjust enrichment, in which
Nimmer writes, " [f] or similar reasons, a state law cause of action for
unjust enrichment or quasi contract should be regarded as an
'equivalent right' and hence, pre-empted."187 Far from endorsing the
use of unjust enrichment logic for analyzing implied-in-fact contract
claims, Nimmer cautions: "In idea cases it is most important that both
the attorneys and the court distinguish between an implied contract
[i.e., an implied-in-fact contract] and a quasi contract since, as will be
seen, recovery may often be had under one theory and not under the
other."1S8
Thus, both Judge Easterbrook's approach and the Endemol-
Wrench-Selby approach suffer from shortcomings that undermine the
force of their arguments. These shortcomings are indicative of the
difficult conceptual task facing judges forced to determine whether
contract rights and copyright rights are equivalent when the contract
in question only forbids actions reserved to the copyright holder
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.
assent as in an express contract."). The only difference is that "[c]ontracs are e-xpress
when their terms are stated by the parties" and "[c]ontracts are implied when their terms
are not so stated." 1 SA.muE. WlfUsToN, Tim L~w OF Co.MACTS § 3, at 3 (1924); mee also 1
E. Au FARVNSWORTH, FARuswoRTH ON CoNmAcrS § 3.10, at 234-35 (2d ed. 1998) ("Some-
times a contract that results from words is described as 'express,' while one that results
from conduct is described as 'implied in fact,' but the distinction as such has no legal
consequences.").
In contrast, an implied-in-law contract is not a true contract, but rather an obligation
imposed by law to avoid unjust enrichment, which may be imposed "%,ithout any expres-
sion of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent." 1 CoRBiN, supra,
§ 1.20, at 64; see also Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("A quasi-
contract, on the other hand, is not a contract at all, but a duty thrust under certain condi-
tions upon one party to requite another in order to avoid the former's unjust enrich-
ment."). As a practical matter, courts may often refer to an action involving a contract
implied-in-lav as an "unjust enrichment" claim or a claim "in restitution." See 1 Corbin,
supra, § 1.20, at 63.
185 Endemol Entm't B.V.v. Twentieth Television Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1528 (CM.
Cal. 1998).
186 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting M-fLVin. B. NLLsR & DAwID NBvLtER, Nzmma ON.
COPMRIGHT § 1.01 [B] [1] [g] (1997)).
187 NiMER & NNNma, supra note 1, § 1.01[B] [1] [g] (footnotes omitted).
188 Id. § 16.03.
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E. Resolving the Impasse
Neither Judge Easterbrook's approach nor the Endemol-Wencli-
Selby approach fully explains whether contract rights and copyright
rights are "equivalent" when a contract merely forbids acts of repro-
duction, performance, distribution, display, or creation of derivative
works. Both present colorable interpretations of "equivalent" rights,
but neither can explain away the other's position. Thus, contractual
obligations to pay for an idea if used create a logical impasse in the
application of § 301: the contractual relationship always provides an
extra element, but that extra element may be qualitatively unimpor-
tant. The statutory provision itself and its legislative history provide
little or no guidance.
Courts can resolve this impasse, however, by remembering that
Congress passed the preemption provision to ensure that copyright
law "would be... more effective in carrying out the basic constitu-
tional aims of uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholar-
ship,"189 and "to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas
between State and Federal protection,"190 which are essentially policy
concerns. Accordingly, courts should incorporate matters of copy-
right policy into their § 301 preemption analysis in order to reach a
result that better approximates congressional intent and vindicates
the underlying purposes of the Act. Part IV of this Note outlines a
policy-driven contract preemption analysis that would help to main-
tain the "delicate balance" of copyright law.
IV
DERIVING GuDIA cE FROM THE DIucATE BALANCE OF
COPIGHT LAW
To ensure that copyright policy informs a court's initial decision
not to preempt a contract claim, policy concerns should guide courts
in their § 301 preemption analysis. 19 1 This Note explained above the
ambiguity of the term "equivalent" rights in deciding whether or not
courts should preempt a contract to pay for an idea if it is used.1 2
189 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745.
190 Id. at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5746.
191 Although one instinctively associates policy analysis with questions of constitutional
dimensions, this Note proposes policy analysis for courts to apply at the statutory stage of
their preemption analysis. See supra note 35 (discussing the two-tiered nature of preemp-
tion analysis). This Note makes this recommendation because, if a court preempts a con-
tract claim on statutory grounds, then it will not reach constitutional preemption analysis
at all. Thus, constitutional preemption analysis plays no role in the initial determination of
which claims should not be preempted. Because of the impasse at the statutory stage of
§ 301 analysis, courts need policy guidance early on in the inquiry.
192 See supra Part III.
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Because of this ambiguity, this Note argues that it is permissible 93 and
indeed beneficial for courts to consider matters of policy in their ap-
plication of § 301.
This Note suggests the following policy-driven analysis for § 301:
when faced with a claim involving a contract that merely forbids per-
formance of an act reserved exclusively to the copyright holder under
17 U.S.C. § 106, courts should take steps to avoid upsetting the deli-
cate balance of federal copyright law. The delicate balance of copy-
right law is upset when a contract purports to remove public rights
under copyright law-such as the right to make use of uncopyright-
able facts and ideas-while the proponent of the contract simultane-
ously takes advantage of copyright's economic incentive system by
injecting the item covered by the contract into the stream of com-
merce. When the delicate balance is upset, courts should preempt
the contract claim; when the delicate balance is intact, courts should
enforce the contract if it is adequately pled and proved. Under this
analysis, many idea-submission contract claims, including the claim in
Selby, should avoid preemption because they involve undisclosed ideas
contained in unexploited media of expression. However, under this
analysis, copyright law would preempt the contract claims involved in
ProCD194 and Wrench.195
A. The Delicate Balance of Copyright Law
Copyright policy has its root in and derives its principal goal from
the constitutional grant of power to Congress "[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [right to their re-
spective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries."19 6 In other words, copyright
law seeks promotion of the public good through a proliferation of
works of art, music, literature, film, and science, so that the public
may enjoy and learn from existing works and also create new, differ-
ent, and improved works.197
193 Cf. Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing "as a canon
of statutory interpretation the principle that when 'neither legislative history nor adminis-
trative interpretation sheds dear light on the meaning of an ambiguous statute, a court is
bound only to render a decision that is reasonable in light of the overall policy of the
legislation under consideration'" (quoting Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 308 (4th Cir.
1980))).
194 See infra notes 226-32. This Note includes analysis of ProCD under its policy frame-
work for the sake of illustration, not because it involved a contract to pay for an idea if used.
195 See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
196 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
197 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) ("[C]op)Tight law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works.");
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of pro-
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Courts and commentators have explained that copyright law
achieves its goal of furthering learning and knowledge through a deli-
cate balance between economic incentives for the creator-author of a
work and maintenance of the free flow of ideas for the public. s98 This
Note envisions copyright policy as a balancing scale: on one side is the
creator-author and on the other side is the public. Copyright policy
seeks to grant the public as much benefit as possible in the form of
new ideas and works of authorship; however, maximizing public bene-
fit depends on giving something back to the creator-author. As Pro-
fessor Karjala writes, the outcome of this balancing, at least in theory,
is that the public, the creator-authors, and the creator-authors' com-
petitors are all better off: "By honing these balances as carefully as
possible, courts attempt to optimize control and return to past au-
thors, create a nurturing environment for future authors, and assure a
good supply of desirable works for consumers."' 99
B. The Creator-Author's Side: The Incentive System
Copyright law uses an economic incentive system to place weight
on the creator-author's side of the balancing scale. This incentive sys-
tem gives authors a limited monopoly in the particular expression of
their work in order to make the creative process economically worth-
mating broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."), superseded by
statute as stated in Broad. Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir.
1991); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPRGHT. PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRAcncE § 1.1 (1989) (stating
that copyright law seeks "to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of
literary, musical and artistic works"); see also Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercializa-
tion in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (1995) (explaining that "[i]f works are not
accessible, neither the public nor competing authors will get the benefit of these new
works," that "[b]enefit to the public is important because the basic purpose of copyright
law is to advance learning and knowledge," and that "[b]enefit to competing authors is
equally important because the authors produce competing works that allow the public a
choice of views and expressions of each kind of work, thus leading to further advances In
public learning and knowledge").
198 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (point-
ing out that congressional enactment of intellectual property legislation "involves a diffi-
cult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the
free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand"), superseded by statute as
stated in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[C]opyright
law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords protection to
authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit the extent
of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation."); Elkin-Koren,
supra note 177, at 100 ("[C]opyright law seeks to balance the level of incentives to create
and the interest in maximizing access to information once created. Finding the correct
balance between access and incentives is the central task of copyright policy."); Kreiss,
supra note 197, at 4 ("To function properly, copyright law must strike a balance between
the rights given to copyright authors and the access given to copyright users.").
199 Karjala, supra note 3, at 518.
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while.200 Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives to the creator-author
the exclusive right, subject to express statutory limitations, to do or
authorize others to do certain enumerated actions: to reproduce, dis-
tribute, perform, display, and to create derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work.20 1
As Professor Kreiss points out, these rights involve making money
from the expressive work, and the exclusivity of the rights "enable[ ]
the author to prevent others from engaging in these money-making
acts, thereby reserving to the author the ability to gain the economic
rewards from the work."202 Kreiss further points out that when a crea-
tor-author "commercializes" her work203 and attempts to make money
from reproduction, public distribution, public performance, or public
display of her work or derivative works, "we should treat the author as
having sought the economic benefits of copyright law."2- 4 For pur-
poses of this Note's proposed preemption analysis, when creator-au-
thors commercialize their work, they enter into copyright law's
incentive system 05 and accordingly owe certain rights to the public in
order to maintain the requisite balance.
200 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ('By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Kreiss, supra note 197, at 4-5. Another
commentator explains the economic incentive system as a means of overcoming a "public
goods problem." O'Rourke, supra note 35, at 483-84.
201 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
202 Kreiss, supra note 197, at 14.
203 Kreiss defines the term "commercalization" as
doing, in a commercial or public setting, any of the acts that are reserved
exclusively to the copyright owner by the Copyright Act under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 and that would be copyright infringement if done by another w ithout
authority of the copyright owner, whether these acts are done for profit or
not; except that the sale of the original copy of a work is not, in and of
itself, a commercialization.
Id at 15 (citation omitted).
"Commercialization" may often overlap with "publication" of a work, but Kreiss points
out that a work may be commercialized without being published. an example being the
source code of computer programs. Id. at 25. Kreiss argues that "commercialization" is a
better term than publication because it "more accurately captures the stage at which an
author attempts to exploit the copyright." Id. For purposes of this Note, the key aspect of
Kreiss's definition of commercialization is that it occurs in a "commercial or public set-
ting," id. at 15, because one obvious difference between shrinkirap licenses and most idea
contracts is that shrinkwrap licenses accompany a widely-distributed product, whereas idea
contracts often concern as yet inaccessible and undisclosed material. The reader should
note that Professor Kreiss considers commercialization to exist "when an author of a
screenplay authorizes the creation of a movie based on the screenplay." Id. at 18. Thus,
the typical screenwriter making an idea submission does not commercialize her work be-
cause she does not authorize the creation of a movie based on the idea, but merely agrees
to disclose the idea in return for remuneration should the recipient choose to use the idea.
204 Id. at 19.
205 See id
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C. The Public's Side: Inherent Limitations on the Copyright
Monopoly
Copyright law also puts weight on the public's side of the balanc-
ing scale to limit the author's copyright rights and "to avoid the effects
of monopolistic stagnation."20 6 In order to maintain the metaphor of
the balancing scale, one may think of each of the limitations placed
on the creator-author's rights as actually being positive lights held (in
a bundle) by the public-the public's copyright rights. 20 7 These
rights consist of limitations on the time a copyright owner enjoys ex-
clusive rights, limitations on what actions will infringe on the copy-
right owner's exclusive rights, and limitations on what aspects of a
creative work the exclusive rights protect in the first place.
First, as the Constitution mandates, 208 copyright's monopoly is
limited in duration, usually to the creator-author's life plus seventy
years. 20 9 Quite simply, this limitation promotes public access to infor-
mation and expressive material because it ensures that eventually the
creator-author of a work of authorship (or more accurately the crea-
tor-author's successors in interest) will have no exclusive rights at all.
Second, the doctrine of fair use limits the exclusive rights of copy-
right owners by granting to the public the privilege of using copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright
owner's consent. 210 Fair use allows the public (subject to judicial bal-
206 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
207 It is helpful to think of copyright law as giving the public something positive to put
weight on their side of the scale, rather than imagining that the balance derives merely
from taking rights away from creator-authors.
208 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to authors the exclusive rights to their
writings and discoveries for "limited [t]imes").
209 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (setting the duration of copyright for works
created on or afterJanuary 1, 1978). For a more detailed discussion of the duration of
copyright protection, including duration for works made for hire, anonymous works, pseu-
donymous works, and works originally created and published or registered prior to January
1, 1978, see U.S. COPYaGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BAsics 5-6 (2000) [hereinafter Co~nluirr
BAsIcs], available at http://vw.loc.gov/copyright/circs/circl.html.
210 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 & n,2, 549.
60 (1985). As the Court in Harper & Row points out, § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act
codified the previous common law doctrine. Id. at 549; see also 17 U.S.C § 107 (1994)
("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching,... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
The statutory provision provides four nonexclusive elements for courts to consider in de-
ciding whether a use is "fair" or not:
(1) the purpose of character and the use, including whether such use is
[for profit or not];
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
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acing of the four § 107 factors)211 to reproduce a creator-author's
expressive material for purposes of research, scholarship, book re-
views, parody, news reports, teaching,212 and even for making record-
ings of television programs for viewing at a later time.213 This public
copyright right promotes public access to information and the crea-
tion of new, different, and perhaps better works.214
The third (and most important for our topic) public copyright
right is the right to use uncopyrightable facts and ideas.215 As Justice
O'Connor explained in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,2 16
[rio this end [of promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts], copyright assures authors the right to their original expres-
sion, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and infor-
mation conveyed by a work .... This principle, known as the idea/
expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of
authorship.217
Id.
211 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,577-78 (1994) (recog-
nizing that the fair use doctrine "calls for case-by-case analysis," and that the statutory fac-
tors must be "weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright").
212 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678-79.
The Report specifies that the enumerated list is "by no means exhaustive." Id., reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5678.
213 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984), super-
seded by statute as staled in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
214 See HoRACE G. BAL, THE Lv oF COPiUGHT AND IrrERAaR PRoPryn § 125, at 260
(1944) ("[Tihe author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works has ala)-s
been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promot-
ing the progress of science and useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works.").
215 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48. The Court first noted: "[N]o author may
copyright facts or ideas .... The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work-termed
"expression"-that display the stamp of the author's originality." Id. at 547 (citation omit-
ted). The Court then continued. "[C]opyright does not prevent subsequent users from
copying from a prior author's work those constituent elements that are not original-for
example .... facts, or materials in the public domain-as long as such use does not unfairly
appropriate the author's original contributions." Id. at 548.
216 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
217 Id. at 349-50 (citation omitted). The idea/expression dichotomy is codified in
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work" 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). House Re-
port 1476 explains that Congress intended to leave intact previous understandings of the
idea/expression dichotomy. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of
copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the
new single Federal system of copyight, that the basic dichotomy between expression and
idea remains unchanged."). Accordingly, the public may (at least with respect to copyright
law) copy an idea found in a book, newspaper article, film, or computer program. This
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The idea/expression and fact/expression dichotomies severely
limit the creator-author's bundle of copyright rights and greatly ex-
pand the public's bundle of copyright rights in hopes of promoting
access to information and stimulation of new works.218 The benefit to
the public is clear:
The idea/expression distinction of copyright is crucial to the opti-
mal advance of culture. We refuse to protect ideas under copyright
not because ideas show no intellectual creativity. Many ideas are in
fact highly creative (think of the theory of relativity-first an-
nounced in a clearly copyright-protected work). Rather, we do not
protect ideas because to do so would not provide an incentive to
creation that would outweigh the harm resulting from tying up so
many cultural building blocks. Even if 99 purchasers out of 100
never have any intention whatsoever of using the work for anything
other than their own reading or consumption pleasure, the use by
that 100th purchaser of the work as a starting point for an improved
theory is crucial to cultural progress.219
Along with the limited duration of exclusive rights and the doctrine of
fair use, these dichotomies define the outer limits of the creator-au-
thor's copyright rights and help maintain the delicate balance of copy-
right law.
D. Maintaining the Quid Pro Quo: Application of the Delicate
Balance to Contract Preemption Analysis
The delicate balance of copyright law entails trade-offs between
the rights of creator-authors and the rights of the public; both sides
benefit from copyright law and both sides make sacrifices because of
copyright law. The creator-author gains exclusive rights to (and the
right to authorize others to) reproduce, distribute, perform, display,
gap in copyright protection makes necessary the question of contractual protection for
ideas in the first place.
The fact/expression dichotomy derives from the constitutional requirement of origi-
nality. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346. Originality only requires that "the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that It
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." Id. at 345. However, because facts
are not "independently created by the author," id., they "are not original and therefore
may not be copyrighted," id. at 350. Accordingly, this dichotomy frees the public to use
facts contained in creator-authors' works of authorship for whatever purposes imaginable.
218 Copyright law places other limitations on creator-authors' copyright rights by ex-
cluding from protection other categories of material, such as "[t]itles, names, short
phrases, and slogans," "mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or color-
ing," "mere listings of ingredients or contents," and "[w]orks consisting entirely of infor-
mation that is common property and containing no original authorship (for example:
standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers, and lists or tables
taken from public documents or other common sources)." COPYRIGHT BAsics, supra note
209, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
219 Karjala, supra note 3, at 520-21.
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or create derivative works from her particular expression,2- and
thereby makes money from her creation.22' But the creator-author
also gives up the right to prevent others from exploiting the ideas and
facts contained within that expression 22 2 and the right to prohibit
others from making fair use of the expression itself.22 The public's
benefits and sacrifices are just the reverse. As one commentator ex-
plains, the delicate balance of copyright is a "quid pro quo."2 4
The essential policy question in this Note's proposed contract
preemption analysis, then, is whether a particular contract upsets this
quid pro quo and thus merits preemption. Several commentators
have suggested that shrinkvrap licenses that attempt to expand the
creator-author's copyright rights upset the delicate balance of copy-
right law and should be preempted.22
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberf 26 provides a good example of how
shrinkwrap licenses may upset the delicate balance of copyright law.
The shrink-rap license in ProCD forbade users of the plaintiff's CD-
ROM database from making the software and telephone listings con-
tained in the database available to other users.2 7 The defendants vio-
lated the shrinkvrap license by uploading the telephone listings to
their own computer, combining the listings with their own search en-
gine, and making the listings available over the Internet.2 8 As facts,
these listings were uncopyrightable, as the Supreme Court made clear
in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,-- 9 and thus the
defendants should have been free to exploit them.
ProCD, the creator-author of the database, had commercialized
its work of authorship by widely distributing it to the public for remu-
220 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
221 See supra Part 1V.B.
222 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
224 Kreiss, supra note 197, at 20. Kreiss writes:
In order for the means [namely, the economic incentive system estab-
lished by copyright law] to further the ends [namely, advancement of learn-
ing and knowledge], the copyrighted works must be accessible. When an
author commercializes a work, the author gets the economic reward in-
tended by the copyright system. If the work is accessible, the public and
competitors get the benefit of being able to study the work's ideas and ex-
pression. In this circumstance, there is a quid pro quo. Both sides get the
benefit that the copyright system was designed to produce.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
225 Se e.g., Elldn-Koren, supra note 177, at 94; Kaijala, supra note 3, at 512; Nimmer et
al., supra note 35, at 23.
226 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.), revk908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996); see supra Part IA.
227 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
228 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
229 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991) ("In no event may copyright extend to the facts
themselves.").
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neration.230 ProCD took advantage of the economic incentive pro-
vided by copyright law by garnering protection for the particular
expression of the listings it had created. 231 Yet ProCD's shrinkwrap
license purported to deprive the public of its copyright right to make
use of facts that are in the public domain. 232 Thus, the shrinkwrap
license in ProCD toppled copyright's quid pro quo, and the district
court reached the correct result in preempting it.
In contrast, many contracts to protect ideas present a different
scenario. Consider, for example, the plaintiff screenwriter in Selby v.
New Line Cinema Corp.23 3 At the time of his alleged agreement with
New Line, Selby had conceived of his idea for "Doubletime," written it
down, and obtained copyright registration for it, but he had not dis-
tributed it to the public.23 4 At least for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, the court assumed that Selby and New Line had an implied-
in-fact agreement that New Line would pay Selby for his ideas if New
Line used them to produce a movie based on them.235 The question
is whether this contract offends copyright policy in the same way as
the shrinkwrap license discussed above.
There is one important similarity between Selby's contract and a
shrinkwrap license. Selby was trying to protect from misappropriation
something that copyright law excludes from protection: an idea.230
Does this mean that enforcing his contract would upset the delicate
balance of copyright? The answer is "no" because copyright's quid
pro quo remained intact, even if the contract barred New Line from
using Selby's idea. Unlike the database provider who sent its expres-
sive material out into the stream of commerce with a shrinkwrap li-
cense attached, Selby had not commercialized his work.23 7 Selby may
have been exercising his exclusive rights by making copies of his work
or distributing the work to New Line, but he was not doing so in a truly
commercial or public setting. 238 Thus he had not garnered the eco-
nomic benefits provided by copyright's incentive system. 239 It is true
that Selby probably wanted to exploit the incentive system of copy-
230 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50. That ProCD had commercialized its product is clear
from the fact that Zeidenberg purchased his copy of the software at a retail store. See id. at
1450. Thus, ProCD had exercised some of the exclusive rights of copyright-namely, re-
production and distribution-and did so in a public or commercial setting. See supra note
203 and accompanying text.
231 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
232 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
233 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see supra Part II.B.3.
234 Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55.
235 Id. at 1057.
236 See supra notes 1-4, 215-17 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
239 See supra Part IV.B.
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right law, and that if the deal between Selby and New Line had gone
through, he would have done so (when New Line made a movie and
distributed it to theaters). However, at the point of disclosure, prior
to dissemination to the public at large, Selby had gained no economic
return from copyright law and owed nothing to the public in order to
keep the delicate balance intact. 240 The balance was already perfect:
Selby made no money from the work (at least no money derived from
copyright protection), and the public received no free access to the
information.2 4' The public should not have been able to claim any
right to exploit Selby's idea because he had not yet sent it out into the
stream of commerce. 242
Besides not disrupting the delicate balance of copyright, con-
tracts like Selby's actually promote the ultimate goal of copyright law.
the furtherance of learning and knowledge through widespread dis-
semination of ideas, works, and information to the public.2 43 Quite
simply, if Selby is allowed to protect an uncopyrightable idea at the
time of disclosure, then he will be more willing to disclose it. Further-
more, once Selby has disclosed the idea to New Line, then New Line
can make a movie from it. Then, if New Line disseminates the movie,
the public would be free to enjoy and exploit the idea as their own
because of the idea/expression dichotomy and the delicate balance of
240 See Karjala, supra note 3, at 524 ("[Copyright's public/priate quid pro quo] is also
in balance when the copyright owner forgoes the economic benefits of idespread distri-
bution and limits access to the work."). Karjala also explains: "A writer should, for exam-
ple, be able to enforce an agreement not to use the underlying idea of her unpublished
novel or script, if such agreement is a condition to access that is not othenise amilable."
Id. at 513.
241 See Kreiss, supra note 197, at 5-6 ("For a work that is not commercialized, the ex-
change is fair. the public receives no access and hence nothing of value; similarly, the
author receives no economic return from a copyrighted work that is not
commercialized.").
242 This Note's framework makes a critical distinction based on whether a creator-au-
thor has commercialized the expressive material that contains the idea in question. This
approach is sound because (1) commercialization identifies the point at which a creator-
author takes advantage of copyright law's incentive structure and thus owes something in
return, see supra Part lV.B.; (2) protecting ideas prior to commercialization is both fair to
the creator-author and creates an incentive for the creator-author to make initial disclo-
sures that facilitate eventual commercialization, which in turn leads to increased public
access to creative works and ideas, cf Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956) ("As
counsel for the Writers Guild aptly say, ideas 'are not freely usable by the entertainment
media until the latter are made aware of them.'"); McGovern, supra note 5, at 505-06 (not-
ing that "[w]hile the idea itself may be free, finding the idea is a service that people are
willing to pay for," that "[Ilike any server, the idea-man provides a means to an end," and
that "[e]ven though the end would ordinarily cost nothing, it should not follow that the
means to the end is also free for the taking"); and (3) protecting ideas through contract
after commercialization is unfair to the public because all interested parties are not repre-
sented in the contracting process, cf. Kaijala, supra note 3, at 519 (discussing the negative
third party effect involved when parties enter into shrinkawap agreements after
commercialization).
243 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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copyright law.244 On the other hand, if the law refuses contract pro-
tection to Selby's idea at the point of its initial disclosure, then he and
other authors, screenwriters, and advertising agencies will not feel
comfortable disclosing their ideas. After all, in this state of affairs,
neither copyright nor contract protects their ideas, and idea-recipi-
ents can pilfer them with impunity.
In sum, courts should not preempt claims involving fully-bar-
gained-for contracts to protect ideas formed in the context of the ini-
tial disclosure of a previously inaccessible idea, even when the
contractually prohibited act is one reserved to the copyright owner
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.
As a final variation, consider, for example, the contracts involved
in Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.245 and Endemol Entertainment B. V. v.
Twentieth Television Inc.246 In the case of Wrench, this Note's policy
analysis suggests that the district court correctly preempted Wrench
LLC's implied-in-fact contract claim. At the time of its alleged con-
tract with Taco Bell, Wrench LLC had already commercialized its
Psycho Chihuahua materials by injecting Psycho Chihuahua T-shirts
and other Psycho Chihuahua merchandise into the stream of com-
merce.247 In other words, Wrench LLC enjoyed the economic benefit
of copyright's incentive system by commercializing its expressive mate-
rial (or authorizing others to do so in return for money).248 Thus, in
order to maintain copyright policy's quid pro quo, Wrench LLC had
to submit to limitations on its copyright rights, including the inability
to protect underlying ideas.
The Endemol situation at first appears similar to that in Wrench
because the plaintiff had distributed the television show "Forgive Me"
in Europe for years before entering into negotiations with Jonathan
Goodson.249 However, Endemol's distribution in Europe does not im-
plicate U.S. copyright law's incentive system in the same way as distri-
bution in the United States. The interaction between copyright's
delicate balance and foreign distribution of expressive materials is be-
yond the scope of this Note and would perhaps provide a fruitful ave-
nue for further research.
From the examples discussed above, one can derive a framework
for analyzing whether copyright policy demands that courts preempt a
particular contract. Courts should look at whether the creator-author
244 See supra Part IVA, C.
245 51 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D. Mich. 1999); see supra Part II.B.2.
246 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see supra Part I1B.1.
247 Irenchk 51 F. Supp. 2d at 842 ("Plaintiffs initially marketed Psycho Chihuahua on a
small scale through use on T-shirts and other merchandise. However, by early 1996,
Wrench had licensed the rights to produce the apparel to several large manufacturers.").
248 See id
249 Endemol 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1524 (typeface altered).
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is attempting through contract to displace the public's copyright
rights while simultaneously taking advantage of copyright's incentive
system by placing his expressive material into the stream of com-
merce-that is, whether the creator-author has commercialized the
relevant expressive material.250 If a creator-author has commercial-
ized the expressive material, then he may not through contract tilt the
delicate balance of copyright law by appropriating rights that copy-
right law grants to the public, such as fair use and the right to exploit
uncopyrightable material. Courts should preempt claims involving
these one-sided contracts if the defendant breaches the contract by
performing an act reserved to the copyright owner under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106. On the other hand, if the creator-author has not commercial-
ized the work, then copyright policy suggests that he may contract to
protect uncopyrightable material, such as ideas or facts, so long as this
protection is merely a condition of disclosure (especially when subse-
quently the expressive material will enter the stream of commerce un-
fettered by contractual restrictions against public use). Courts should
enforce this latter type of contract, even if the defendant breaches the
contract by merely performing an act reserved to the copyright owner
under § 106.
CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the current state of the law surrounding
copyright preemption of contracts to protect ideas, especially when a
contract prohibits the idea-recipient from performing an act reserved
to a copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106. To alleviate the logical
impasse that emerges when courts attempt to determine whether con-
tract rights and copyright rights are "equivalent" within the meaning
of 17 U.S.C. § 301, courts should (as part of their § 301 analysis) con-
sider how the particular contract in question interacts with copyright
policy. If courts follow this suggestion, then copyright law will be able
to further its ultimate goal of promoting "the [p]rogress of [s]cience
and useful [a]rts,"251 and idea-persons will be able to protect their
ideas that are embodied in as yet undisclosed and unexploited expres-
sive materials. Because this protection for undisclosed ideas promotes
the confident exchange of ideas, this protection will in turn help soci-
ety maximize its enjoyment of all the fruits of new ideas by facilitating
the cooperative process through which an idea becomes a reality.
250 See supra note 203.
251 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
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